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Abstract
In this paper we analyze the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) as a federal central bank
system. First, the degree of decentralization of the ESCB will be briefly compared with its
predecessor, the Deutsche Bundesbank, and its counterweight in the US, the Federal Reserve
System. Moreover, the development during the period 1990-99 of the total, economics and research
staffing of the ECB and the national central banks in the EU will be investigated and also the staff
ratios of the national central banks in 1999. Furthermore, the research activities of the central banks
in the European Union over the period 1990-99 will be analyzed both in terms of input (economics
and research staff) and output (quality-weighted number of articles in scientific journals). The share
of economics research staff in total staff of the national central banks varies between 0.02 and 0.17.
The ECB has the highest ratio between economists and researchers and other staff. A ranking of
research performance based on the quality-weighted number of scientific articles per economics and
research employee reveals that the Bank of Finland has the best research performance of European
central banks, followed by De Nederlandsche Bank, the Banco de Portugal and the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank. There is only a weak relationship between the research performance and the share of
research staff. The conclusion “small is beautiful” also seems to hold for the economics and
research departments of the European central banks.
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1. The European System of Central Banks: A Federal Central Bank System 
 
The European System of Central Banks (ESCB) consists of the European Central Bank (ECB) in 
Frankfurt-am-Main and the national central banks of the fifteen member states of the European 
Union (EU). The basic tasks of the ESCB is to determine and implement the monetary policy in 
the euro-zone, to perform money market operations and currency market transactions (including 
foreign exchange intervention), to hold and manage official currency reserves of the in the euro-
zone participating countries and to promote an efficient and prompt working of the (European) 
flow of payments. These are all areas, in which the euro-zone national central banks have had to 
hand over their monopoly to the ESCB from January 1, 1999 onwards. Such a transfer of the 
national policy sovereignty has been unique till now in the history of European integration. The 
ECB and the participating national central banks are denoted as the Eurosystem. The Eurosystem 
is governed by two decision making official bodies, the Governing Council and the Executive 
Board.
1 The Governing Council is the most important decision making official body of the 
federal central bank system and consists of the management of the ECB, the Executive Board, 
and the Governors and Presidents of the national central banks of the countries within the euro-
zone. The Governing Council is responsible for the determination of the euro-wide monetary 
policy, whereas the Executive Board is qualified to implement this monetary policy in 
accordance with the by the Governing Council determined decisions and guidelines. Furthermore, 
the Executive Board gives instructions to the national central banks in carrying out the execution 
of the euro-wide monetary policy, in particular money market management. The Executive Board 
of the ECB consists of the President, the Vice-President and four other members. The European 
Council appoints the members of the Executive Board for a term of (at most) eight years and the 
sitting members cannot be reappointed. The impossibility of reappointment is intended to 
guarantee their personal independence. With regard to the monetary policy decision making both 
the members of the Executive Board and the remaining members of the Governing Council are 
supposed not to act as representatives of the national interest, but in a completely independent 
capacity. The Executive Board comes together at least ten times a year and meets in practice 
every two weeks. This happens most of the time in Frankfurt-am-Main, but not always. By the 
tradition of the Bundesbank the Governing Council wants on occasion to meet at a national 
central bank to underline the European nature of the system. 
 
Recently, the Governing Council of the ECSB decided to reduce the frequency of monetary 
policy decisions in principle from every two weeks to every month. President Duisenberg stated 
in that respect the following (see ECB, 2001, p. 3): “Finally, I would like to inform you that the 
Governing Council has decided that, as from today, it will – as a rule – assess the stance of the 
ECB’s monetary policy only at its first meeting of the month. Accordingly, interest rate decisions 
will normally be taken during that meeting. At the second meeting of the month, the Governing 
Council will deal for the most part with issues related to other tasks and responsibilities of the 
ECB and the Eurosystem. After the second meeting of the month, a press release on the ECB’s 
monetary policy decisions will no longer be issued. Obviously, if warranted by the 
circumstances, the Governing Council can still decide to change the key ECB interest rates at any 
time, regardless of previously scheduled meetings (as was recently demonstrated by the decision 
                                                 
1 In addition there is a General Council that exists of the Executive Board and the Governors and Presidents of all the 
fifteen EU countries. When all the EU member states participate in the euro, than the ESCB and the eurosystem 
respectively the General Council and the Governing Council will converge. See also: Eijffinger and De Haan, 
(2000).  
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to lower interest rates on 17 September 2001).” This reduction of the frequency of monetary 
policy decision making as a rule is good news because a lower frequency mitigates uncertainty 
regarding the European money market interest rate, and, thereby, its volatility. 
 
 
2. The European System of Central Banks: The Degree of Decentralization 
 
The ECSB follows the decentralization principle. This means that the ECB makes, as much as 
possible and suitable, an appeal to the national central banks as her operational arms for the 
implementation of monetary policy transactions. The national central banks should follow in a 
uniform way the instructions and guidelines of the ECB in such a way that this decentralized 
approach does not undermine the smooth functioning of the Eurosystem. Some critics, for 
example The Economist, think that the decentralization of the ESCB is an unfortunate design 
flaw of the designers of the central bank system.
2 According to them the structure of the ESCB is 
more decentralized than other federal organized central bank systems, like the German 
Bundesbank and the US Federal Reserve System. Within the ESCB national central banks have 
more power than the regional banks in other federal systems. In the first place the system has a 
decentralized  voting system, in which at this moment twelve of the eighteen votes in the 
Governing Council are with the national central banks. This is a relative high number in 
comparison with presently the nine votes of the German regional Landeszentralbanken within the 
(at most) seventeen members consisting Zentralbankrat, the official body of the Bundesbank that 
determined monetary policy in Germany till January 1, 1999.
3 This number of national votes is 
also relatively high in comparison with the five Presidents (four Presidents on a rotating basis and 
the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York) of the regional Federal Reserve Banks 
with voting power within the twelve members counting Federal Open Market Committee, which 
is responsible for the open market policy in the United States. The Board of Governors has got a 
comfortable majority of seven votes in this important decision making body.
4 Although the 
Governing Council of the ESCB is considered to determine a ’one-size-fits-all’ policy in view of 
the whole euro-zone, there is always the danger that the national central bankers in the Governing 
Council will be influenced by the economic, financial and monetary circumstances in their own 
country. Such a national orientated voting behavior will certainly weaken the credibility and 
effectiveness of the Eurosystem's monetary policy.
 5  
 
                                                 
2 See: The Economist, Euro Towers or Fawlty Towers?, 31 October 1998. 
3 Very recently, the Deutsche Bundestag  (parliament) has proposed a complete reorganization of the Zentralbankrat 
of the Bundesbank to totally eight members of which the President, Vice-President and two other members will be 
appointed by the Federal Government and four members on recommendation of the Bundesrat (senate) after 
consulting the Federal Government. See: Kissler and Preuschoff (2002). 
4 For a description of the development of the political and institutional independence of the Federal Reserve System, 
see: Akhtar and Howe (1991). These authors demonstrate that the Federal Reserve System had in the 1930s a more 
decentralized monetary policy decision making, which was responsible for its weakened position as monetary policy 
maker. The experience of the 1930s resulted in a more centralized decision making process within the Federal 
Reserve System.  
5 According to De Haan, Berger and Inklaar (2002), the decision-making process of the ESCB is too decentralized in 
case of diverging economies and preferences. For the euro area countries they find that, despite convergence, 
important differences in terms of economic performance and preferences remain. As all national central banks have 
one vote within the Governing Council, there is a risk that national considerations may prevail over euro-wide 
considerations.  
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Some other critics, mainly from the large euro countries, think that the smaller euro countries are 
more than proportionally represented in the Governing Council of the ESCB. The central bankers 
of the eight smaller countries - Austria, Belgium, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal - have with ten (eight national central bankers plus two members in the 
Executive Board) of the eighteen votes a majority in the Governing Council. This majority forms 
a sharp contrast with the two votes for Germany (one national central banker and one Executive 
Board member), whereas the German GDP is about twice the combined GDP of these eight 
smaller countries together.
6 Nevertheless, the designers of the ESCB have, also on instigation of 
the German government of that time, deliberately chosen for the principle of ’one (wo)man, one 
vote’ to underline the collective responsibility of the Governing Council. The system of 
collective decision-making within the ESCB compensates for possible power broking by large 
countries like France and Germany.
7  
 
The voting power is obviously in the advantage of the national central banks, but the ESCB is 
also decentralized in other ways.
8 In this respect one might think of the relative size of both the 
total staff and the staff of the economics and research department of the ECB in Frankfurt-am-
Main that both in total and concerning the economic department in comparison with the total, 
economics and research staff of the participating national central banks. Next to this the size of 
the total ECB staff (based on 1999 data) is also still much smaller than the size of the directorates 
of other federal central bank systems, namely the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System in Washington, D.C. and the Directorate (Direktorium) of the Deutsche Bundesbank in 
Frankfurt-am-Main. As is commonly known, the Bundesbank was perceived as the role model 
for the design of the ESCB. The relatively size of the total staff and the economics and research 
staff of the ESCB (ECB and the national central banks) and the staffing of the Federal Reserve 
System (Board of Governors and Federal Reserve Banks) and the Deutsche Bundesbank 
(Directorate and Landeszentralbanken) are reproduced in Table 1. From Table 1 it is quite 
evident that the trimming down of both the total staffing (almost 16000 employees) and the 
economics and research staffing (more than 200 employees) of the whole Bundesbank, in 
particular at the regional Landeszentralbanken, is just a matter of time. The same applies for the 
Banque de France with its totally 17000 employees (estimation) which mostly due to the large 









                                                 
6 The GDP per vote in the Governing Council of the ECB differs from 14 billion euro for Luxembourg to 933 billion 
euro for Germany. The Netherlands with the ECB President and the President of De Nederlandsche Bank has a 
favourable position with a GDP of 160 billion euro per vote (based on OECD data from 1997). 
7 See Hochreiter (2000) about the de jure empowerment of small EU countries (e.g. Austria and the Netherlands), 
which have pegged to the Deutsche mark before January 1, 1999.  
8 For a detailed, yet not entirely objective argumentation: Angeloni (1999).  
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Table 1. The Degree of Decentralization of the Federal Central Bank Systems 
 
Federal central bank 
systems: total system 
versus centre and ratio 
centre/total system 
 
Total number of 
employees of the federal 
central bank system and 
centre 
Number of employees of 
economic and research 
departments of total 
system and centre 
Federal Reserve System  25000  830 
-Board of Governors  1700 374 
-Ratio Board  / Total  6.8% 45% 
Deutsche Bundesbank  15881  223 
-Directorate  2579 72 
-Ratio Directorate / Total  16% 32% 
ESCB (ECB & NCBs)  47942  1628 
-ECB  732 134 
-Ratio ECB / ESCB  1.5% 8.2% 
 
The Federal Reserve System employees are based on 1996 data (partly estimated), Deutsche 




3. The Total, Economics and Research Staff of the European Central Bank and the 
National Central Banks in the European Union  
 
Despite of the very recent expansions of its staff, the ECB in Frankfurt-am-Main is both in terms 
of its total staff and its economics and research staff still quite modest when compared with a 
federal central bank system like the Federal Reserve. It is clear that the ECB recruits especially 
employees for its economics department. This has not only to do with the fact that the ECB 
delegates operational tasks to the participating national central banks, but also with the explicit 
task of the ECB to collect euro-wide statistical data and to conduct a euro-wide analysis of the 
economic, financial and monetary developments. In Figure 1 the development of the number of 
employees of the ECB is shown. The ECB was established in June 1998. In 1999 the total staff 











                                                 
9 However, it should be mentioned that the ECB is expanding pretty fast in terms of total staffing and economics and 
research staffing. The most recent data (based on the beginning of 2002) are 149 employees at the Directorate-
General Economics and 50 employees at the Directorate-General Research (including secretaries, research analysts 
and economist statisticians).  
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Finally, the huge number of employees working on the national central banks within the ESCB, 
in total almost 48000 employees (based on 1999 data), in striking. The US Federal Reserve 
System performs similar tasks with almost the half of the personnel, namely 25000 employees 
(based on 1996 data). It is evident that some trimming down of the national central banks, 
especially the Deutsche Bundesbank with his almost 16000 employees (based on 1998 data) and 
the Banque de France with his roughly 17000 employees (estimation) is unavoidable. In Figure 2 
the number of staff is shown of the Directorate (Direktorium) of the German Bundesbank in 
Frankfurt-am-Main during the period 1991-1999 (data were not available for 1990). In total there 
were 2606 employees working at the Directorate in 1999. 
 
 

































   
But also Southern-European central banks, like the Banca d’Italia with totally more than 8700 
employees and the Banco de España with almost 3200 employees, could use some streamlining. 
As shown in Figures 3 and 4, the total number of employees has been relatively constant during  
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They could follow the example of their Scandinavian sisters, like the Finnish and Swedish central 
banks with respectively 785 and 466 employees in total. These numbers are given in Figures 5 
and 6. In Sweden the total staff is strongly decreasing. In both Sweden and Denmark the 
proportion of the economics and research staff is increasing. Denmark has totally 556 employees 
as is shown in Figure 7. During the period 1990-1999 one may observe for most central banks a 
gradual decrease of the total number of employees, while the number of employees at the 
economics department (and, if existent, the research department) remain rather stable or 









































   
 































   
 
For Sweden only data for the period 1992-1999 were supplied. It is quite remarkable that the total 
staffing of Sveriges Riksbank has become even smaller than that of the Bank of Finland (Suomen 
Pankki) and Danmarks Nationalbank, despite the fact that Swedish population is roughly the 
same as the Finnish and Danish population together.   
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In Portugal both the number of total staff and the number of economics staff decreased in the 
period 1990-1999, which is shown in Figure 8. In 1999 the total staff of the Banco de Portugal 
was 1826 and its economics staff 82 persons. 
 
 






























The Irish central bank has no research staff and its economics staff consisted of 27 people in 
1999. Figure 9 gives the total number of staff, which has decreased from 651 in 1990 to 578 in 





































The next countries that will be discussed are the three Benelux countries (Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg). The number of employees working at the (very recently 
established) central bank of Luxembourg has grown in the past few years as one can see in Figure 
10. The total staff is consists of only 152 people, which makes the Luxembourg central bank the 
smallest in the EU. Its very new economics departement has 24 employees and and there is, of 
course, no separate research departement. The National Bank of Belgium has also no research 
department. The total staff of the Belgian central bank has decreased from 2917 employees in 
1990 to 2449 in 1999. This is shown in Figure 11. 
 
  








































































In the Netherlands the total staff of the central bank increased from 1660 employees in 1990 to 
1748 in 1999. The economics staff decreased and the research staff increased, which can be seen 
in Figure 12. It should be mentioned that De Nederlandsche Bank is one of the few national 
central banks (next to the Central Bank of Ireland) with an increasing number of total employees. 
Since 1995 its total staffing increased with 192 within four years. 
   
 


































   
 
As is reproduced in Figure 13, one may observe that Greece’s total number of employees did not 
change a lot during the period 1990-1999. The Bank of Greece has, like a lot of smaller EU 
member states, no research department. Its total staffing was 3216 persons and its economics 
staff consisted of 131 persons in 1999. That implies that the total number of employees of the 
Bank of Greece is even larger that that of the Bank of Spain, while the Greek population is almost 








































The total staffing of the Oesterreichische Nationalbank has decreased by 268 employees from 
1223 persons in 1990 to 955 persons in 1999. The central bank of Austria has next to its 
economics department only since 1995 a separate research department, which is shown in Figure 
14. The number of economics and research staff was respectively 52 and 6 persons in 1999. Very 




































   
 
The Bank of England has experienced a strong decrease of its total staff from 5140 employees in 
1990 to 2663 employees in 1999, but its economics staff has risen. The Bank of England has as 
one of the few larger central banks no separate research department. This is a deliberate policy of 
the Bank of England in orde to mix research and conjunctural activities in one overall 
department. The largest economics area within the Bank of England is Monetary Analysis with 
                                                 
10 Therefore, the total staffing of the Austrian National Bank continued to decrease furher in 2000 (954 employees) 
and 2001 (943 employees).  
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Table 2. The Staff Ratios of the National Central Banks in the European Union. 
 
  
Total staff CB / 
population 
Economic staff CB/ 
population 
Research staff CB / 
population 
Belgium  2.50E-04 5.00E-06 0
Germany  3.10E-05 8.65E-07 1.10E-07
Greece  3.02E-04 1.25E-05 0
Spain  8.10E-05 6.09E-06 3.30E-07
France NA NA NA
Ireland  1.69E-04 7.11E-06 0
Italy  1.56E-04 3.96E-06 0
Luxembourg  0 5.56E-05 0
The Netherlands  1.09E-04 3.99E-06 1.77E-06
Austria  1.43E-04 6.42E-06 7.41E-07
Portugal  1.82E-04 8.20E-06 0
Finland  1.51E-04 7.12E-06 3.65E-06
United Kingdom  6.00E-05 3.09E-06 0
Sweden  8.50E-05 5.06E-06 7.87E-07
Denmark  1.10E-04 6.98E-06 0
 
Source: The ratios are based on the results of the mentioned questionnaire and the World Bank data on 
population (1999).  
 
 
In Table 2 the most recent ratios (for 1999) of total staff/population, economic staff/population 
and research staff/population for the national central banks in the EU are given. These staff ratios 
show large differences both in terms of total staffing and in economic (and research) staffing for  
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central banks performing similar functions as the operationals arms of the ESCB.
11 The ECB 
performs different, strategic functions as the directorate of the ESCB and is, consequently, 
excluded from this table.  
It is clear from Table 2 that especially the central banks of Greece and Belgium have a huge total 
staff in relation to their population size. The opposite is true for Luxembourg, Germany, the 
United Kingdom and Sweden. Luxembourg has the highest ratio of economic staff related to 
population size, while Germany has the lowest. The research staff divided by the population size 
is the greatest in Finland. In eight of the fifteen countries the research staff is zero. These 
countries are respectively Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, the United 
Kingdom and Denmark. In these countries the economic staff of the central banks are conducting 
also research activities and are mixing research and conjunctural work.
12 Therefore, it is quite 
essential to relate the research output of the ECB and the national central banks to the sum of the 
economic staff and, if existent, the research staff of that central bank.     
 
 
4. The Relevance of Research Activities of Central Banks and Other Institutions 
 
Central banks have a number of functions, ranging from formulation and supervision of monetary 
policy to supervision of financial institutions. A good research department may be instrumental 
for performing these functions by assisting in formulating monetary policy.  Good research is 
however a factor of its own for the reputation and credibility of central banks.  Although good 
research is important, the quantity and quality research of central banks and international 
financial organisations has not been investigated.  
An external committee evaluated the research activities of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and concluded that, although the Fund produces some excellent research products, there 
was substantial room for improvement in the overall quality of the Fund's research (see IMF, 
2000).  Furthermore, the mix of research and the link between some of the Fund’s research were 
not optimal. These conclusions were based on an in-depth evaluation of research output of the 
various departments of the Fund.  
Like the IMF, most central banks engage in research activities. There are good reasons why they 
should. For one thing, central-bank governing councils require information and interpretations of 
economic situations on which to base their policy decisions. This type of research is mainly 
policy analysis. However, other types of research can also be helpful - or even essential - for a 
central bank. As the external examiners of the IMF put it: “Any organisation that relies on old 
ways of doing things in a changing world will eventually cease to be relevant. There is much still 
to learn in the field of economic policymaking, and [a central bank] must continue to learn and 
update its thinking” (IMF, 2000, p. 16). 
This does not imply that a central bank should try to produce all the research that is relevant for 
its needs. Certain areas of research are better left to academia. Still, there are many good reasons 
why in-house research is essential for a central bank (see also IMF, 2000): (1) staff interested in 
doing research need to be given the opportunity to conduct research so that a central bank can 
hire and retain the best economic minds; (2) research is more easily drawn into the process of 
                                                 
11 It should be mentioned that some national central banks, like De Nederlandsche Bank, are also responsible for 
banking supervision which function adds to their total staffing. 
12 For most central banks the reason to combine research and conjunctural activities is related to their relative small 
size. For some central banks, such as the Bank of England, it is a matter of policy not to have a separate research 
department.  
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policymaking when the same people that do research are also involved in the policymaking 
process of the central bank; (3) staff can gain an in-depth intuition from conducting their own 
research that can be called upon to help in the policy design process; (4) successful in-house 
research can independently help enhance the credibility and reputation of the central bank.
13 
From the perspective of a regional central bank in a decentralized system of central banks - like 
the European System of Central Banks – there are additional considerations (see Goodfriend, 
1999; Angeloni, 1999).
14 The diversification of research within a system of central banks brings a 
variety of analytical perspectives to policy deliberations that are invaluable in an increasingly 
complex economy.
15 Moreover, a system of regional banks harnesses competitive forces to 
encourage innovative thinking within the central bank. 
The remainder of this paper will provide an evaluation of the quantity and quality of the research 
activities of the central banks of the member countries of the European Union (EU). Quality of 
research has various dimensions. Research at the central bank can be considered of high quality 
when it proves to be useful in developing and executing policies of the central bank. This aspect 
of quality is difficult for outsiders to analyse. Instead, we focus on another indicator for research 
quality, i.e. whether the research papers have been published in refereed professional journals. In 
this note we report the outcomes of an investigation based on the frequency of publications in 
international economics journals. The results are based on a survey of European central banks in 
which various questions related to research were asked.  
The next section, Section 5, briefly outlines the survey and shows the evolution of the relative 
size of the research departments for the central banks for which this information is available. 
Then in Section 6 we report on research output in the form of absolute and relative numbers of 




5. The Relative Size of Economics and Research Staff of the ECB and National Central 
Banks in the European Union 
 
All EU central banks were sent a questionnaire in which we asked questions such as: What is the 
total number of staff employed by the central bank over the period 1990-1999? How many staff 
is working in the economics and research departments over the period 1990-1999? In which 
scientific journals did your staff publish papers over 1990-1999? Many, but not all central banks, 
were willing and able to answer these questions.  The answers to this questionnaire form the 
input for this and the following section.   
Table 3 shows the size of respectively the total staff, the economics and research staff, and the 
ratio between both for the ECB and the national central banks in the EU. The data refer to the 
average for 1990-1999 or for the period for which data are available. Staff in the economics and 
                                                 
13 Until the 1960s the research activities within the US Federal Reserve System (Board of Governors and regional 
Federal Reserve Banks) were poor. In the 1960s the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis started to develop research 
activities (e.g. the St. Louis equation) by hiring young, bright economists. Soon after, the Board of Governors and 
other Federal Reserve Banks also felt the need to develop research activities to influence FOMC policy making. I am 
grateful to Jürgen von Hagen for making this point. 
14 For a detailed comparison of the ESCB with the Federal Reserve System, see Fase and Vanthoor (2000). 
15 As Goodfriend (1999) points out, within the US Federal Reserve System research departments of reserve banks 
often develop a specialisation. A reserve bank president may encourage research of one type or another; or a 
particular economist may make a department strong in a particular sort of research. A bank may also exploit a feature 
of its regional economy or its operational responsibilities to develop a research advantage. 
16 These sections are heavilly based on Eijffinger, De Haan and Koedijk (2002).  
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research departments is counted together. A few conclusions can be drawn. First, the absolute 
size of the European central banks varies considerably (see also Vaubel, 1997). Second, the 
central banks show considerable divergence in terms of the relative size of the economics and 
research departments. The ECB has, by far, the highest ratio between the economic and research 
staff and the total staff. This is, of course, a consequence of the fact that the ECB plays a key role 
in formulating monetary policy, while national central banks in principle only have operational 
responsibilities, like conducting money market management and foreign exchange interventions, 
and research activities to feed their Governor or President in the Governing Council. Some 
national central banks have other responsibilities too, such as supervision of the financial system. 
Of the national central banks, the central banks of Spain and Portugal have the highest ratio 
between economics and research staff and total staff, followed by the central banks of Denmark, 
the Netherlands, Sweden and Finland. The central banks of Belgium, Germany and Italy have the 
lowest ratio.   
 
Table 3. The Total Staff and the Economics and Research Staff, 1990-1999 (averages) 
 
Central Bank of:  Total staff:  Economics and 
Research staff: 
Ratio: 
Austria 1,243  50  0.041   
Belgium 2,695  49  0.018   
Denmark 582  33  0.057   
Finland 826  45  0.055   
France NA  NA  NA 
Germany 2761  69  0.025   
Greece 3240  118  0.038   
Ireland 621  23  0.037   
Italy 9,229  212  0.023   
Luxembourg 141  22  0.156   
Netherlands 1,655 95  0.057   
Portugal   1,966  129  0.067  
Spain 3,175  253  0.080   
Sweden 807  42  0.056   
UK 4,050  116  0.031   
ECB 633  110  0.172   
 
Source: Eijffinger, De Haan and Koedijk (2002). 
 
Notes: Data for Luxembourg and the ECB refer to 1998-99; data for Sweden refer to 1992-99. 
For Portugal the data until 1996 include Statistics staff. 
 
From Figures 1 to 15 we have seen that some central banks increased the relative size of their 
economics and research staff considerably (notably Sweden and the UK), while others show a 
more modest increase (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany and Greece). Portugal shows a 
decrease in the relative number of economics staff, which is, however, due to the fact that the 
figures for 1990 up to 1996 include statistics staff. The Netherlands shows a small but steady 
decline, while in Belgium, Ireland and Italy the relative size of the economics staff engaged in 
research remained more or less constant. The figures for the Spanish central bank suggest that 
both the economics and research staff and the total staff remained the same during the 1990s.   
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6. The Research Output of European central banks 
 
In this section we look at the research output of the European central banks for the period 1990-
1999. As pointed out in the introduction, we measure quality by counting the number of scientific 
journal publications per employee. Measuring output per employee seems natural as size of the 
various central banks differs a lot. As there exist considerable quality differences between 
scientific journals, we apply a weighting scheme. We ranked the selected international journals 
into three classes: top journal, very good journal and a good journal (see Appendix B in 
Eijffinger, De Haan and Koedijk (2002) for further details).
17 A top publication delivers three 
points, a very good publication two points and a good publication one point. We calculated the 
research output per employee by multiplying the number of journal articles by the respective 
scores for the journal (either 3, 2 or 1) and dividing the resulting sum by the number of 
employees.  The resulting research output per employee is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. The Weighted Journal Publications per Employee of European Central Banks 
(including the ECB) for the period 1990-1999. 
 
Central Bank of:  Total number of 
journal publications: 
Quality-weighted 
number of articles: 
Quality-weighted number 
of articles per economics 
and research staff: 
Austria 14  17  0.34 
Belgium 7  9 0.19 
Denmark 3 5  0.15 
Finland 20  35  0.78 
France NA  NA  NA 
Germany NA  NA  NA 
Greece NA  NA  NA 
Ireland 3  4  0.17 
Italy 7  19  0.09 
Luxembourg NA  NA  NA 
Netherlands 49  68  0.72 
Portugal   31  50  0.39 
Spain 29  51  0.20 
Sweden 5  12  0.24 
UK 8  14  0.08 
ECB (1994-99)  29  50  0.45 
ECB (1998-99)  13  23  0.21 
Source: Eijffinger, De Haan and Koedijk (2002). 
 
Notes: Figures for UK and Sweden refer to 1998-99. Figures for the ECB refer to 1994-99 or 
1998-99. In the first case the publications of the ECB research staff during 1994-97  (during 
their previous professional life) were also counted. 
                                                 
17 Of course, not all international journals can be considered to be top, very good or good journals. These other 
journals are mostly national-oriented journals or journals that are not refereed according to an objective refereeing 
process. The list of the Association of Cooperating Dutch Universities (VSNU), which is used for measuring of 
research output and for allocating research funds among and within Dutch universities, is used as a basis for selecting 
top (A), very good (B) and good (C) journals.     
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From Table 4 it becomes clear that the Bank of Finland (Suomen Pankki) has the best research 
performance of European central banks, closely followed by the Dutch central bank. The Finnish 
central bank has a very active research department with a relatively small staff, which does not 
only publish in international (top) journals but also on a regular basis organise high level 
conferences with international research networks such as the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) and the Centre of Economic Policy Research (CEPR). Apparently it pays off 
to have a clear strategy with respect to research. The second place goes to De Nederlandsche 
Bank. This primarily reflects the strong performance of its research department. This part of the 
Bank has a strong tradition in applied econometric research and macro-economic modelling. The 
third place is occupied by the Banco de Portugal, while the fourth place is for the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank, which has built a niche with its research focus on Central and 
Eastern European countries. The fifth place is for the Swedish central bank, while the sixth place 
goes to the ECB in Frankfurt. However, when we also take the output over the period 1995-98 
into account, the ECB occupies the third place, before the Austrian and Portuguese central banks. 
This is a remarkable achievement. It is clear that the ECB invests a lot in attracting 
internationally reputed academics, especially for its Directorate-General Research but also for its 
Directorate-General Economics. 
 
Is there a relationship between the relative priority that a central bank gives to research (i.e. the 
input) and the quality of research as measured by scientific publications (i.e. output)? Table 5 
shows the rankings of the various central banks for which we have information on both input 
(relative size of the economics and research department) and output (quality-weighted number of 
publication per employee). It follows that there is only a weak relationship between input in 
terms of relative size of economics and research staff and output in terms of international 
scientific publications.
18 Apparently, if you do not have as a central bank the argument of 
strength, you do need to have the strength of the argument. In other words, other factors than the 
relative size of the economics and research departments determine the quality of the research 
output of central banks. It is quite remarkable that central banks of small countries (in terms of 
inhabitants) have such a relative good research performance.
19 Possibly, there is an incentive for 
them to increase their weight in the decision-making process through a reputation of high-quality 
research. An alternative factor that comes to mind is these central banks' general attitude towards 
openness and, hence, interaction with the national and international academic world.  
 
. 
                                                 
18 This outcome seems in line with the theory of bureaucracy that predicts larger bureaucratic structures will be less 
effective per person in producing output. See Niskanen (1971). 
19 After we had finished our research we also received information on the scientific publications of the Swiss central 
bank, the Schweizerische Nationalbank, which confirms this conclusion.  
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Table 5. Rankings of Relative Size and Quaility-Weighted Research Output Ratios  
 
Central Bank of:  Ranking relative size of 
economics and research 
departments (input): 
Ranking quality-weighted number of 
articles per economics and research 
staff (output): 
Austria 8  4 
Belgium 12  8 
Denmark 5  10 
Finland 7  1 
Ireland 9  9 
Italy 11  11 
Netherlands 4  2 
Portugal   3  3 
Spain 2  7 
Sweden 6  5 
UK 10  12 
ECB (1998-99)  1  6 
 





In this paper we have analysed the ESCB as a federal central bank system. First, the degree of 
decentralization of the ESCB has been briefly compared with its predecessor, the Deutsche 
Bundesbank, and its counterweight in the US, the Federal Reserve System. Moreover, the 
development during the period 1990-99 of the total, economics and research staffing of the ECB 
and the national central banks in the EU is investigated and also the staff ratios of the national 
central banks in 1999. Furthermore, the research activities of the central banks in the European 
Union over the period 1990-99 are analysed both in terms of input (economics and research staff) 
and output (quaility-weighted number of articles in scientific journals). The share of economics 
research staff in total staff of the national central banks varies between 0.02 and 0.17. The ECB 
has the highest ratio between economists and researchers and other staff. A ranking of research 
performance based on the quality-weighted number of scientific articles per economics and 
research employee reveals that the Bank of Finland has the best research performance of 
European central banks, followed by De Nederlandsche Bank, the Banco de Portugal and the 
Oesterreichische Nationalbank.  There is only a weak relationship between the research 
performance and the share of research staff.  The conclusion “small is beautiful” also seems to 
hold for the economics and research departments of the European central banks. Again, if you do 
not have as a small national central bank the argument of strength, you do need to have the 
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•   I would like to thank the organisers first, for putting together such a fine variety of papers to 
discuss what I consider to be a most relevant topic: the experience gained by the European 
Monetary Union and the potential prospects for other regions of the world. And second, for 
inviting me to discuss a paper as thought-provoking as that presented by professor Eijffinger. 
•   I shall commence by commenting on Eijffinger's results on the research performance at the 
ESCB. Then I will move to the more general issue of the functioning of the Eurosystem, 
which Eijffinger's paper covers very broadly, considering the role I think the economics and 
research departments of the national central banks should play.     
•   I am deeply convinced of the usefulness of economic research on the design and 
implementation of monetary policy. As central bankers we need at this stage to promote 
economic research to broaden our knowledge of the euro-area economy. This will also 
enhance the reputation and credibility of the Eurosystem.  Moreover, research activities must 
be of the highest possible quality and, to that end, we need rigorous evaluation processes.  
•   Nevertheless, the two statistics considered in this paper, the relative size of the economics and 
research staff and the relative weight of journal publications, do not suffice for me to evaluate 
properly the quality of the research activities of central banks. We are comparing highly 
heterogeneous institutions. Not only the functions for which each central bank is responsible 
should be taken into account (the most obvious example is banking supervision) but also the 
responsibilities of each economics department. It is not a simple division between  
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conjunctural and research activities, as the author thinks, that may also come into play. But 
the organisational structures that include 'doing research' usually cover other activities. For 
example, statistics, communication with the ECB or other international institutions, 
publications and language services, computer and library services may, in some cases, come 
under the economic and research bodies. Since this possible bias may be correlated with the 
size of the central bank, I am not surprised that the ranking of quality supports the conclusion 
that "small is beautiful".       
•   When considering the organisation of the ESCB, professor Eijffinger compares the 
Governing Council voting system and the relative size of the ECB/ESCB with the Federal 
Reserve System and the Deutsche Bundesbank. He concludes that both aspects indicate the 
over-representation of the national central banks. But the past experience of the institutions 
making up the Eurosystem and the fact that it is their constituencies who assess their 
performance cannot be forgotten. In the case of the Eurosystem, some of the principles 
guiding decision-making are based on the distinctive multi-country nature of the euro area. 
•   The ESCB is a newly created institution with a federal system, and its design has been based 
on similar principles to those implemented by the Federal Reserve. These are a long-term 
commitment to price stability, the independence of their government bodies and, finally, the 
accountability and transparency of its policy strategy. But as a means of retaining a balance 
between these principles, the existence of sovereign states and the need for the Eurosystem to 
act as a single and unified decision-making entity, it was decided to establish a one-person-
one-vote principle in the Governing Council.  
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•   Some critics have noted that the ESCB's decision-making process entails the risk that regional 
(national) considerations may prevail in policy decisions. Rather, I think that since January 
1999 we have observed some divergences in the economic performance of the European 
countries and that monetary policy actions have been guided by the performance of the 
overall euro area.  Naturally, in the future, the decision-making bodies must be adapted to the 
enlargement process in order to preserve efficiency principles. That will probably require 
reforms in the voting procedure on the basis of the Nice agreement, following a 
representativeness rule but retaining the principle of 'one member, one vote'. The extent to 
which this reform is made consistently and appropriately (in accompaniment of economic and 
monetary union) will also have a significant impact on monetary policy credibility. 
•   For an example of this new and complex ESCB framework, we must think of the new 
functions actually being performed by the economics and research departments of the NCBs. 
For one thing, the differences in euro-area economic structures pose difficulties for obtaining 
a clear picture of overall economic developments and how the transmission of monetary and 
non-monetary shocks operates. In this context, the NCBs currently play a pivotal role 
gathering and analysing information for the proper assessment of the monetary policy in the 
euro zone. For example, the contribution of the economics departments is particularly 
important in the production of the ECB's macroeconomic forecasts and in analysing the 
economic policies that remain decentralised, such as fiscal policies and wage-setting 
procedures. 
•   For another, the NCBs are responsible for explaining the implications for the national 
economies of decisions taken at the euro-area level. National central banks should be the  
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voice of the Eurosystem as regards the specific situation and problems of each national 
economy to their economic agents.  
•   Moreover, the economics departments of the NCBs have to follow continuously the current 
economic conditions and give a public opinion about how the monetary policy stance 
interacts with the non-monetary policies that remain under the sovereignty of the national 
economies. This is more relevant for those countries for which there are not other public or 
private agencies making a regular analysis of its corresponding macroeconomic performance.    
•   Finally, let me say that if there is an area in which decentralisation has clear advantages and 
best reflects the functioning of the ESCB is on research activities. Competition among 
institutions will incentive new ideas and results, enhancing the quality of our decision 
process. Moreover, being part of the Eurosystem does not exclude the existence of 
idiosyncratic economic policy issues that must be incorporated into the research agenda of 
each national central bank. An example is that the existence of a monetary union obliges us to 
inquire into the possible causes of real and financial regional imbalances and the best policy 
to implement in each case. Another example is that in a monetary union the concept of 
aggregate competitiveness is not only a matter of relative prices and costs but also of 
analysing concepts more related to the long-run growth performance, such as the degree of 
sectoral competitiveness, specialisation or research and development activities. This is why I 
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First of all I want to thank the organizers of this conference for offering me the possibility to 
discuss the enlightening paper of Sylvester. But maybe I am also determined to discuss such a 
paper as I worked in one of the central banks which he evaluated. Let me structure my comments 
into three parts: the first shortly repeats what the paper does in concentrating on some very 
specific points. The second explains what the paper does not, but what I would have expected. 
And the third raises some open questions and makes some suggestions for further research in the 
spirit of the paper. Overall, I will raise more questions than presenting answers. 
1.  What the paper does 
 
As regards the institutional setting Sylvester greatly appreciates the decision taken by the 
Eurosystem at the end of last year to reduce the general frequency of monetary policy decisions 
to one per month. In his view this enhances the forecastability of money market rates and 
mitigates their volatiltity. This is a point not very convincing to me as, a priori, there is no clear-
cut relationship between the predictability of interest rates and the frequency of monetary policy 
decisions is not. On the other hand, Sylvester criticizes the degree of decentralization of the 
Eurosystem of being too high as regards the voting system and the size of the staff. Concerning 
the latter, he argues that in general a trimming down of the National Central Banks (NCBs) is 
unavoidable, but economics and research staff should increase. Currently, there are not only large 
differences in total staff per population ratios, but also for economics and research. Spain and 
Portugal have the highest, Germany and Italy the lowest ratios of economics/research staff to 
total staff. The main part of the paper consists of the presentation of a survey of EU central banks 
on their research quality. Research quality is measured by publications (per employee) in refereed 
journals (3 classes) in the 1990s. The results are surprising in the sense that the smaller central 
banks perform best (Suomen Pankki and De Nederlandsche Bank). Furthermore, there is only a 
weak input-output relationship based on staff size. The reasons for this may be found in the 




2. What the paper does not 
 
With respect to the voting mechanism I miss a discussion of the problems related to EU and 
EMU enlargement. With up to 12 new members entering EU and EMU in the first decade of the 
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st century the current procedures (one vote for each board member and for each NCB) cease to 
be feasible. As you all surely know the ECB and the EU Commission are working on a proposal 
for changing this mechanism. There would have been several topics to be discussed (see e.g. 
Ruckriegel/Seitz, 2002): Should there be a rotation principle? Should the votes of the Board 
members be the decisive ones? Are the Federal Reserve System and the former Bundesbank a 
benchmark for this decision?  
I would also have expected some analysis of the situation since the beginning of the 
common monetary policy for EMU. Especially interesting would be whether the monetary policy 
decisions of the Eurosystem were based on the euro area as a whole or not (see Meade/Sheets, 
2002, for the case of the Fed)? Remember for instance the first interest rate decision of the ECB 
of April 1999 to lower rates which could only be justified with reference to the economic 
situation in Germany and Italy. Moreover, if national developments are important one may ask 
which countries are the relevant ones and whether it is the voting behaviour of the Board 
members or that of the Presidents of the NCBs which reveals the importance of national 
developments? In answering these and related questions it is also necessary to take into account 
that for markets the policy results matter, not the divergences in the voting behaviour. And finally 
it would be interesting to analyze which institutional structure fosters a warranted 
“denationalisation of monetary policy”?  
Let me also make a few remarks on the division of labour between the ECB and the 
NCBs within the Eurosystem. For example, does it make sense for the NCBs to specialize on 
certain topics as is the case for some Federal Reserve Banks in the US. According to which 
criteria should this decision be made? And which role should the ECB play in such a system? 
The division of labour is also related to the division of information between then ECB and the 
NCBs. The decisive question here is who gets and who should get which informations? 
Currently, I sometimes have the impression that the position of the NCBs is too strong in this 
respect. In general, the Eurosystem has to find a balance between centralized decision-making 
and decentralized implementation by NCBs (see Lannoo/Gros, 1998). This split may hinder or 
favour the integration of (financial) markets.   
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3. Open questions and suggestions for further research 
 
The quality of the research and economics staff of central banks is only one aspect. The quality of 
the central banks in general and their monetary policies is another. If there is a positive 
relationship (what I hope), one may ask whether it is stable over time. In dealing with these two 
aspects it is in any case necessary to cope with the situation of the Deutsche Bundesbank. What 
does the monetary policy reputation and success of the Bundesbank mean against the background 
of the relatively low research output as measured in the paper? Is there perhaps a trade-off 
between successful monetary policy and successful research and between openness/transparency 
(which kind?) and reputation (Schich/Seitz, 2000)? Against this background it has to be taken 
into account that research is not only undertaken in research and economics departments, but also 
in banking, statistics, international, operations, etc. Furthermore, it was the agreed-upon internal 
“policy” of some NCBs (especially of the Bundesbank) until the mid 90s not to publish with the 
personal name of the authors but only with the name of the institution.  
This leads us to the question which research topics should be on the agenda of central 
banks and how research should be organized at central banks, especially in a monetary union (see 
e.g. Hefeker, 2001). Is it only monetary theory and policy or all fields of economics? Finally, as 
in every time series analysis, possible structural breaks have to be considered. In many empirical 
papers dealing with monetary policy of the Eurosystem you can find a disclaimer in the very last 
paragraphs which states that the results should be interpreted with caution as they are based to a 
large part on data before 1999, i.e. a time where there were still national monetary policies in the 
euro area. This may also be an important factor with respect to the question of research quality. 
The Eurosystem is only existent since 1999. And we all know: THE TIMES THEY ARE A-
CHANGIN‘!! Competition between the NCBs on the one side and the ECB on the other has 
certainly increased since 1999. And one part of this competition is necessarily on the field of 
research. In other words, it may very well be that the past results are only a poor predictor of the 
future.  
Despite these critical remarks I cannot help expressing my respect for the effort Sylvester 
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